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This paper considers the factors responsible for differences with age in estimates of the wage compensation
an individual requires to accept increased occupational fatality risk.  We derive a relationship between
the value of a statistical life (VSL) and the degree of complementarity between consumption and labor
supplied when health status serves as a potential source of variation in this relationship. Our empirical
analysis finds that variations in an individual's health status or quality of life and anticipated longevity
threats lead to significant differences in the estimated wage/risk tradeoffs. We describe how extensions
to the specification of hedonic wage models, including measures for quality of life and anticipated
longevity threats, help to explain the diversity in past studies examining how the estimated wage–risk















Complementarity and the Measurement of Individual Risk Tradeoffs:  
Accounting for Quantity and Quality of Life Effects 
I. Introduction 
Recent research has identified how complementarity relationships help in 
resolving some empirical puzzles in economics.  In the first of these papers, Chetty 
[2006] develops an upper bound on the coefficient of relative risk aversion using labor 
supply elasticities. His relationship implies that the bound varies with the degree of 
complementarity between consumption and labor supplied.  A second paper by Hall and 
Jones [2007] uses a form of complementarity to explain the rationality of an increasing 
income share for health expenditures as incomes grow.  In particular, Hall and Jones 
assume consumption goods and health services are weakly complementary.  We argue 
that combining these two independent insights provides a possible explanation for yet 
another puzzle largely associated with microeconomic applications—the relationship 
between age and the marginal willingness to pay for risk reductions (the value of a 
statistical life or VSL) and the diverse empirical findings from revealed preference 
studies designed to examine this relationship.
1   
We use Chetty’s result to show that complementarity between consumption and 
labor supply implies, in the absence of other considerations, a lower estimate for the 
value of a statistical life than would be implied by models that assume independence. We 
hypothesize that health status may well be a third influence on individual choice. That is, 
                                                 
1 Chetty describes the logic for our proposed analysis as follows: “If complementarity between 
consumption and labor is sufficiently strong, even highly risk averse individuals may choose not to reduce 
labor supply when wages rise because increased consumption makes work less painful” (p.1821).    3
a person’s state of health may influence the extent of complementarity between labor 
supply and consumption.  
This logic is consistent in broad terms with the arguments in Hall and Jones 
[2007] where health expenditures contribute to maintaining a health state.  Improvements 
in health increase the value of leisure and change the types of goods consumed.  Thus, 
improved health increases the demand for leisure and with it demands for a different mix 
of consumption goods, which in turn reduces the apparent degree of complementarity 
between labor supply and a fixed weight measure for aggregate consumption.  Thus, 
differences in the degree of complementarity between labor supply and consumption 
among individuals with different health states offer one potential explanation for why we 
might observe differences in estimated VSLs across individuals of different ages.  
Finally, identifying the relationships among health status, complementarity, and 
estimated risk/wage tradeoffs helps to reconcile diverse findings regarding the 
relationship between age and the VSL in the revealed preference literature.  Viscusi and 
Aldy [2007] suggest lower VSL estimates among the older workers in their sample, with 
a sample mean age of 39; Smith et al. [2004] fail to find lower VSL estimates for the 
older workers in their sample, with a sample mean age of 55.  Neither analysis, however, 
controls for differences in health status among workers.  If the distribution of health 
status varies among those workers in the two samples, then this variation could help to 
explain the observed differences in empirical results. 
This paper examines the effects of an individual’s health status or quality of life 
as well as a person’s latent perceptions of his (or her) longevity on estimates of the VSL. 
Our analysis considers a sample of older workers who participated in the Health and   4
Retirement Study (HRS).
2  We find these measures for quality and quantity remaining of 
life influence the risk/wealth tradeoffs in ways that are consistent with our 
complementarity explanation.  Specifically, we exploit the panel dimension of the HRS to 
define a measure of subjective quality of life based on a survey response given two years 
before labor market choices are reported.  The motivation for our measure of the 
(subjective) quantity of life remaining stems from results in Smith et al. [2001] that 
suggest a respondent’s perceived longevity can be viewed as a latent variable from the 
analyst’s perspective.  While this latent variable influences the other risks an individual 
will assume, it is not completely reflected in subjective longevity assessments elicited at 
the time the labor market behavior is recorded.  Thus, we use a future death (or another 
serious health condition) as an instrument for a respondent’s current perceptions of 
personal longevity or as a subjective measure of the “quantity” of life remaining.  
Typically, the analyst is unable to take into account how these factors would affect risk 
taking behaviors; the HRS panel structure allows us to consider them.  
Section two provides a brief summary of the policy context for the questions 
associated with the sources of heterogeneity in risk preferences.  The third section 
describes the theoretical logic that underlies the tests in our basic empirical model.  
Section four summarizes our data and findings and the last section discusses their 
implications.  
II. Policy Context 
  In 2002, EPA’s Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for the Clear Skies initiative 
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [2002]) included an adjustment to the VSL 
                                                 
2 The HRS (Health and Retirement Study) is sponsored by the National Institute of Aging (grant number 
NIA U01AG09740) and conducted by the University of Michigan.  Where possible, we rely on the RAND   5
estimates used to monetize the benefits from reduced risks experienced by older 
populations. Specifically, the RIA included an estimate of the mortality benefits of the 
proposed regulations using a VSL estimate discounted by approximately thirty-six 
percent. The resulting controversy over this “senior discount” has affected subsequent 
policy guidance, scientific reviews of the literature, and research.  For example, following 
this controversy the Office of Management and Budget [2003] has suggested that 
regulatory agencies consider the possibility of using cost effectiveness analysis and 
quality adjusted life years to acknowledge that policies yield risk reductions to 
heterogeneous populations.  In a recent advisory letter to the EPA Administrator, the 
Environmental Economics Advisory Committee of EPA’s Science Advisory Board 
(SAB) addressed the policy use of VSL estimates adjusted for differences in life 
expectancy.  The letter concluded that: 
“…The VSL may increase, decrease or remain constant as life expectancy 
decreases.  The relationship between the VSL and life expectancy is 
therefore an empirical matter. In practice, because life expectancy is 
difficult to observe, the Agency will have to relate the VSL to factors 
related to life expectancy – namely age and health status.  Although the 
literature on the relationship between age and VSL is growing, the 
Committee does not believe that it is sufficiently robust to allow the 
Agency to use a VSL that varies with age” 
(Morgan and Cropper [2007], emphasis added). 
 
This conclusion is important because there is a sharp contrast between summaries 
of the results from revealed preference studies that rely on evidence from the labor 
market and the estimates from stated preference studies.
3  In a review of the revealed 
preference research that has examined the age-VSL relationship, Aldy and Viscusi 
[2007b] conclude that the VSL varies with age and that there is sufficient information to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Corporation’s cleaned version of the HRS.  Otherwise, we use the raw HRS data. 
3 See also the review of the stated and revealed preference literature in Evans and Smith [2006].   6
suggest “…VSL increases with age, peaks in mid-life, and subsequently declines” (p. 
257).  By contrast, Krupnick [2007] concludes, based on his review of the stated 
preference findings, that “…considering the weight of the evidence, the implication is 
that for countries that apply a single VSL to adults of all ages, there is insufficient 
information and consensus to make a reasoned decision to switch to using either 
different VSLs for different ages (in a private-good context) or a VSLY [value of a 
statistical life year] which imposes a linear (discounted) relationship between life-years 
remaining and the VSL” (pp. 275-276, bracketed phrase added). 
Even if the empirical issues could be resolved, a decision about how, in a 
normative sense, to treat heterogeneity in risk preferences elicits a broad range of 
emphatic (if not dramatic) responses.  The same SAB advisory letter we cited earlier 
concludes its recommendations by noting that 
“…while there is no denying the reality of income effects, it is a policy 
judgment, not a scientific question, whether the same VSL should be 
employed in all regulatory decisions across a society or different values 
should be closer depending upon the preferences and income of the 
population affected by a specific regulation” (Morgan and Cropper 
[2007]). 
 
Aldy and Viscusi [2007b] confirm the importance of these considerations using a 
new set of estimates of the wage/risk tradeoffs that provide age-specific VSLs.  They 
compare the benefit estimates for the Clear Skies Initiative derived using their age- and 
industry-specific measures of the VSL to the estimates derived using the EPA’s constant, 
consensus VSL estimate.  Their results suggest about a forty percent reduction in the 
benefits of the Clear Skies Initiative for older populations using the age-differentiated 
VSL measures.     7
  Of course, using a constant VSL to estimate the aggregate benefits of a policy that 
affects a population with different VSLs is inconsistent with the basic principles 
underlying benefit-cost analysis.  As Sunstein [2004] observes, “a movement toward 
greater individuation of VSL would undoubtedly be extremely controversial.  But it is not 
merely consistent with that theory that justifies current practice; it is mandated by it.  In 
principle, government should not force people to buy protection against statistical risks 
at a price that seems to them excessive” (p. 5, emphasis added). 
Sunstein’s argument for complete individuation is unlikely to be politically or 
practically feasible.  Most of the policy uses for estimates of income-risk tradeoffs are in 
short-term policy analyses with modest resources for new research and short time 
horizons for completion.  Moreover, in many cases, the epidemiological analyses used to 
identify the relationship between environmental quality and health risks simply do not 
have the ability to carefully distinguish how each policy will impact sub-groups in a 
heterogeneous population.  These limitations are noteworthy because they impose 
genuine practical constraints on what constitutes feasible policy analysis.  In reality, the 
uncertainties in measurement largely trump the political debates about the fairness of a 
framework that allows a level of individuation that would be consistent with revealed 
preference measures of risk tradeoffs. 
These concerns aside, the logic of the hedonic wage equilibrium suggests 
heterogeneous risk preferences and skills in adapting to job risk will cause workers to sort 
among jobs based on their personal attributes.
4  Both an individual’s quality of life and 
                                                 
4 The basic logic of the equilibrium described in a hedonic model has generally been recognized as a 
matching process (see Rosen [1974] for an early discussion).  Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim [2002] 
provide a brief overview of how this interpretation of the market equilibrium affects the identification of 
structural parameters governing the behavioral functions in the process and what can be identified.    8
quantity of life remaining should affect how he or she makes choices in the labor market.  
As a result of this sorting, the market equilibrium will reveal different wage/risk tradeoffs 
across workers based on each individual’s personal circumstances.  The empirical 
challenge in measuring the role of each person’s quality and quantity remaining of life for 
risk/compensation tradeoffs is to identify instruments that adequately reflect these 
dimensions and permit the analysis to overcome the effects of endogeneity of 
contemporaneous measures of these effects. 
Given the potential constraints on the feasible responses to the empirical evidence 
from a policy perspective, why study the sources of differences in VSL?  We believe 
research on the behavioral sources for differences in the tradeoffs people would make to 
reduce risk can influence other dimensions of risk assessments by identifying the 
important features of the heterogeneity in people’s risk tradeoffs. That is, with this 
information it is possible for analysts to focus on a subset of key distinctions that can 
arise in selecting the components of the overall risk analysis for special emphasis.  
Inevitably the preparation of each regulatory impact analysis faces resource and time 
constraints.  Nonetheless, even if the analyst never explicitly assigns different values to 
each group, knowledge of the potential for differences in the tradeoffs among different 
groups can contribute to the design of sensitivity analyses to gauge how policy judgments 
would change with individuation.  
Our application does not have sufficient information to develop reliable measures 
of the VSL for specific groups of individuals.  Instead, we use the results to estimate the 
wage-risk tradeoff for one group of individuals relative to another group.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Recently Shogren and Stamland [2002] focus on the information to be derived by describing how 
individuals' observable characteristics might influence what can be learned from equilibrium schedules.   9
 
III. Complementarity and the VSL 
  The motivation for our empirical analysis in the next section combines insights 
from three recent papers by Smith, Pattanayak, and Van Houtven [2003],  Chetty [2006], 
and Hall and Jones [2007] on the relationships among the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of 
relative risk aversion, the compensated labor supply elasticity, the degree of 
complementarity between consumption and labor supply, and the value of a statistical 
life.  The first (Smith et al. [2003]) develops a simple link between the uncompensated 
labor supply elasticity and the VSL for a specific preference specification, based on 
Burtless and Hausman’s [1978] framework.  In particular, Smith et al. find that the wage 
risk tradeoff can be expressed as in equation (1),  







         ( 1 )  
where p represents fatality risk, w is the wage, and  lw ε denotes the uncompensated 
(Marshallian) labor supply elasticity.  Chetty [2006] provides the second insight, which 
confirms a more general link between labor supply elasticities and estimates of the VSL.  
Using a general indirect utility function, denoted  ( ) l c v , , defined in terms of Hicksian 
composite goods for the inter-temporal choices of consumption goods (c) and labor 
supply (l) over the life cycle, Chetty [2006] develops a relationship between the Arrow 
Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion (R) and the ratio of the income elasticity of labor 
supply to the substitution elasticity of labor supply (or compensated labor supply   10
elasticity), and the proportional response of consumption to changes in labor supply. 

































= α  with m and w representing unearned income and the wage rate, 
respectively.  Labor income is given by  l w⋅ .   lm ε , 
c
lw ε , and  ucl ε  denote the income 
elasticity of labor supply, the compensated labor supply elasticity, and the elasticity of 
the marginal utility of consumption with respect to labor respectively.
6 
The compensated and Marshallian elasticities of labor supply can be related using 
a Hicks-Allen equation as in (3) 
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Solving equation (3) for  lm ε  and substituting the result into (2), with some manipulation, 
we have: 
   ) 1 ( R ucl
c
lw lw α ε ε ε − + = .                      (4) 
Increased complementarity between consumption and labor supplied increases 
ucl ε .  For a given coefficient of relative risk aversion (R), share of wage income in total 
                                                 
5 Equation (2) is also related to another connection more closely linked to environmental applications, the 
willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) disparity.  It is an extended version of the 
relationship Hanemann [1991] used to explain dramatic differences between WTP and WTA for non-
market environmental services by establishing a simple connection between the price flexibility of income 
for non-market goods, the income elasticity of demand for these goods, and an elasticity of substitution 
between these non-market environmental services and a composite of all other goods. 
6 The relationship between the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion and the income elasticity of 
the VSL is closely related to our discussion here.  This relationship was discussed by Eeckhoudt and 
Hammitt [2001] in an appendix to a paper that focused on the role of background risk for the properties of 
wage risk tradeoffs. More recently, Kaplow[2005] develops an analogous relationship to discuss the 
properties of the income elasticity of the VSL.   11
income (α ), and compensated labor supply elasticity (
c
lw ε ), increased complementarity 
implies a higher Marshallian labor supply elasticity ( lw ε ) and, by equation (1), a lower 
VSL.  If good health increases the demand for leisure and leisure- related consumption 
goods, then this change can in turn reduce the apparent degree of complementarity 
between labor supply and a consumption aggregate as depicted in the Chetty formulation. 
  Thus, to the extent improved health increases the complementarity between 
leisure and consumption we should expect an individual would require greater 
compensation to accept risk (a higher VSL).  With poorer health (i.e., a poorer quality of 
life), leisure is less complementary to consumption, the uncompensated labor supply 
elasticity will be larger and the VSL smaller.  Of course, it is important to acknowledge 
the other parameters included in equations (2) and (4) are not constants and can be 
expected to change with health status.  Our argument merely provides motivation for one 
possible channel of influence on the labor supply elasticity – health status as an influence 
on the complementarity between consumption and labor supply. This connection in turn 
helps to explain how an individual’s health status can affect her willingness to accept 
wage compensation to accept risk and thus measures of the VSL.   
While health status can be considered a measure of the quality of life, our analysis 
cannot ignore the potential for the remaining quantity of life to impact the estimated wage 
risk tradeoffs (Pratt and Zeckhauser [1996]).  Therefore, our empirical analysis contains a 
measure for health status (or quality of life) as well as an instrument intended to reflect 
each individual’s unobserved subjective longevity expectations (or perceptions about the 
quantity of life remaining).  Estimates from past studies (including our own) that have 
examined the relationship between age and the VSL will reflect the joint impacts of   12
differences across individuals in the effects of health status and serious threats to 
longevity. To the extent health status, subjective beliefs about longevity, or some 
composite of the two effects are correlated with age and separate measures of these 
effects are not included in the specification of the wage equation, the omission has the 
potential to influence estimates of the effects of age on risk tradeoffs.  Our analysis seeks 
to disentangle these effects.  Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient information to 
allow a formal test of the hypothesis that differences in estimated VSLs with health status 
stem from differences in the extent of complementarity between consumption and leisure 
(labor supply). 
 
IV. Empirical Model, Data, and Results 
Our empirical analysis relies on the observed labor market experiences of 
respondents in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). We exploit the panel dimension 
of this survey to distinguish measures of the increased risk of death and the deteriorating 
quality of life for this sample of older adults.  In earlier research (Smith et al. [2004]) we 
did not take full advantage of these opportunities. Our earlier analysis was comparable to 
the rest of the literature in that we assumed difference in individuals’ assessments of the 
quality of their lives as well as their beliefs about longevity would not independently 
influence risk tradeoffs revealed in the labor market choices; rather, we assumed age 
would proxy for these effects.  We also used an average job risk measure for all 
respondents in an industry and assumed this aggregate measure was relevant for the 
largely older workers represented in the HRS.   13
Recently, Aldy and Viscusi [2003, 2007a, 2007b] have proposed the use of the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) to 
develop a refined measure of job risk that accounts for the ages of workers.  They 
structure mortality risk cells for each industry (by 2-digit SIC code) and age group.  Our 
analysis uses the same on-the-job fatality risk measures, based on workers’ ages and 
industries. 
We consider three sets of models.  The first is our primary model.  The model 
controls for demographic attributes, occupation, a measure of risk tolerance (again as a 
qualitative variable), and the age- and industry-specific job risk.  This model treats age 
non-parametrically, using a set of categorical variables that distinguish different age 
intervals.  We consider interactions of job risk with age, risk tolerance, as well as the 
quality of life measure and our instrument for perceived longevity.  To evaluate the 
sensitivity of our findings to the treatment of age, our second set of models includes age 
and age squared as an alternative description for how age has been hypothesized to 
influence wages along with risk tradeoffs. This specification also includes the same 
controls as in the primary model.  The third set of models excludes age and risk tolerance 
measures to evaluate whether the effects of the health status variable and the longevity 
instrument are influenced by the presence of these other controls.  Finally, the last set of 
models considers the effects of health status and longevity separately to evaluate whether 
these variables offer robust measures of the separate influences of individual effects of 
the quality and the quantity of life remaining.  Rather than report all the estimates for 
each model we present the key parameter estimates for our primary model and include   14
selective comparisons using the estimates with the other sets of findings.  These added 
models are intended to be largely checks on the robustness of our main results.  
There is an important qualification to our estimates. We do not claim that the 
HRS sample provides sufficient information to estimate the VSLs for heterogeneous 
workers over the full range of individual circumstances. As we and others have 
previously noted (see for example Viscusi and Aldy [2007]), the HRS is intended to 
reflect behavior of older adults.  The younger respondents in the sample are spouses (or 
partners) of the targeted population. Equally important, the mix of industries and 
occupations represented may not be as detailed as the samples usually considered for 
estimating wage risk tradeoffs. Finally, to assure our analysis is aligned with the hedonic 
wage model’s assumptions we limit the sample to respondents paid by the hour. These 
restrictions yield a smaller sample in comparison to what has been available in other 
recent hedonic wage studies.   
As a result of these considerations, we focus on how the relative risk tradeoffs 
among workers within this sample vary with health status and longevity threats. Equation 
(5) adapts the conventional form of a wage hedonic function to include the added terms 
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Individual characteristics including race, gender, and education are represented by  kit x , 
with the subscript t indicating the period of interest.  The  rit Occ  terms identify a set of 
occupational dummy variables.  Our notation uses (t – 1) as a subscript to imply the   
interview wave preceding the occupational outcome (the preceding interview actually 
occurred two years earlier than the current wave) and (t + 1) for the subsequent wave 
(two years later). 
BLSriskit measures the number of fatalities per 10,000 workers associated with the 
individual’s industry, based on the 2-digit SIC code, and age range (16-19, 20-24, 25-34, 
35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+).
7  The age- and industry-specific fatality data are from the BLS 
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries while the age- and industry-specific employment 
data are annual averages based on the Current Population Survey.   
Age, in our primary model, is treated non-parametrically with the  lit Age  terms.  
The five terms classify respondents into one of six age classes, 44 and under, 45-50, 51-
55, 56-60, 61-65, and over 65 (i.e.,  1 = lit Age  if respondent i’s age falls in the lth age 
class and 0 otherwise; the omitted category is greater than 65).  The  () 1 − t ji Tol  terms refer 
to dummy variables formed using a qualitative variable defined by the risk tolerance 
measure described in Barsky et al. [1997].  The risk tolerance index is based on responses 
from a previous interview to questions about choices between a secure job for life and 
another job with a 50-50 chance of two different income levels.
8  With locally constant 
relative risk aversion, the answers classify respondents into one of four risk tolerance 
categories, with category 1 indicating the least risk averse and 4 the most.  The risk 
                                                 
7 Note that the two youngest age ranges are not represented in our sample. 
8 The risk tolerance question was not asked in all waves of the HRS.     16
tolerance index included in equation (5) is therefore a measure of financial risk aversion.  
While by definition an increase in risk aversion defined as in the term’s colloquial use 
increases the VSL, Eeckhoudt and Hammitt [2004] show that the effect of an increase in 
financial risk aversion on the WTP to reduce mortality risk is, in general, ambiguous.   
  The last three interaction terms provide our basis for distinguishing the effects of 
health status/quality of life and serious threats to longevity on the estimated risk 
tradeoffs.  In constructing these terms, we make use of two additional binary variables, 
represented in equation (5) by  () 1 − t i Exhealth  and  () 1 + t i Dead . 
  Our quality of life measure,  () 1 − t i Exhealth , is defined based on each individual’s 
response to a question about the state of his or her current health as excellent, very good, 
good, fair, or poor and exploits the panel featuring the HRS.  We use each individual's 
response to this health question in the preceding wave.
9  Thus the qualitative variable 
() 1 − t i Exhealth  corresponds to answers from the interview preceding the observed 
occupational choice.  If a respondent answered that he or she was in excellent health the 
variable is coded as unity.  Otherwise,  () 1 − t i Exhealth  takes a value of zero.   
() 1 + t i Dead  is constructed to identify those individuals facing impending, serious 
threats to longevity.  While information about immediate, serious health conditions may 
be known to respondents, it appears that they do not report all aspects of their subjective 
assessments at the time of each wave's interview (see Smith et al. [2001]).  Therefore, we 
use the occurrence of death in the near future to proxy for such information.  () 1 + t i Dead  is 
a dummy variable to identify people who died between the interview wave when their   17
labor market choices were reported and the subsequent interview.  These are confirmed 
deaths and not sample attrition for other reasons.
 10   () 1 − t i Exhealth  and  () 1 + t i Dead , through 
the final three interaction terms in equation (5), provide instruments for identifying the 
effects of excellent quality of life and serious longevity threats on estimated risk 
tradeoffs. 
As noted in Smith et al. [2004], selection into the labor force or into other 
employment categories such as retirement is an important consideration when examining 
the occupational choices of older workers.   In order to address this, we follow the same 
logic as discussed in Smith et al. [2004], relying on the Bourguignon et al. [2001] 
generalization of the two step selection framework.  We first estimate a multinomial logit 
selection model of labor force status.  The  sit S  terms in equation (5) are then the 
expectations for the wage model’s error conditional on employment state that arise from 
the selection model (see Smith et al. [2004] for further discussion) and reflect choices at 
the extensive margin (e.g., work, retire, unemployed, etc.) that give rise to selection 
effects on wage models.  
Our wage model estimates are based primarily on information obtained in wave 2 
of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), conducted in 1994.  The HRS is a panel 
survey designed to represent individuals between ages 51 and 61 in 1992 and their 
spouses (whose ages need not fall within the targeted age range).  The initial interviews 
were conducted in 1992 with follow-up interviews scheduled every two years.  The 
baseline survey included 12,652 persons (7,600 households).  The panel was designed to 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Both current and previous wave responses to these health condition questions are also significantly 
different for respondents who die between waves 2 and 3 and those who do not (results for the current wave 
are: χ
2=40.40, p-value=0.00 and for the previous wave: χ
2=21.73, p-value=0.00).   18
achieve several objectives (see Juster and Suzman [1995]) including monitoring work, 
health, and income relationships.  The HRS structure allows construction of the quality of 
life instrument based on wave 1 (1992) subjective health status and the impending serious 
health shock instrument based on deaths between waves 2 (1994) and 3 (1996).  For 
consistency with the notation adopted in equation (5), the time subscripts  1 − t , t, and 
1 + t  correspond to 1992, 1994, and 1996 respectively.    
While a number of waves are available for analysis, when considering waves 
beyond wave 2 (1994), the analysis confronts the limitations imposed by the age profile 
of the sample. This structure implies a decrease in the number of respondents with typical 
employment patterns. This decline limited our earlier analysis of wage/job risk tradeoffs 
as the HRS sample aged.
11  For this reason, our current analysis focuses on labor market 
experience as of wave 2.  As noted earlier, our sample for the hedonic wage model is 
limited to workers paid on an hourly basis, where the BLS fatality rates are more likely to 
reflect the job risks faced by workers.   
Estimation of the multinomial logit selection model requires that we define 
relevant labor force status categories, working and paid by the hour being one such 
category.  We select five other categories: working and not paid by the hour, 
unemployed, retired and not currently working, disabled, and not in the labor force.  As 
in Smith et al. [2004], we hypothesize that an individual’s marital status, age, number of 
people living in his household, his household’s capital income, and whether or not his 
health limits his work opportunities will influence his labor force status decision.     
                                                                                                                                                 
10 Unfortunately the records do not include information about the causes of death.   
11 See Smith et al. [2004] for an example of the marked decline in workers from wave 1 continuing to work 
by wave 4.   19
Table 1 reports the results of the multi-state selection model in addition to 
summary statistics by labor force status.  Coefficients are interpreted as relative to the 
excluded category, working and not paid hourly.  For example, the coefficient on age is 
positive and significant for the disabled category, suggesting that, relative to respondents 
who are working and not paid hourly, respondents who are disabled tend to be older.  The 
results suggest that relative to respondents who are working and not paid hourly, 
respondents who are working and paid hourly, unemployed, or disabled are less likely to 
be married.  The negative and significant coefficient on household capital income for all 
categories indicates that household capital income is lower for other respondents relative 
to respondents who are working and not paid hourly.
12  Relative to respondents who are 
working and not paid hourly, respondents who are unemployed, retired and not working, 
disabled, or not in the labor force are more likely to report that their health limits their 
ability to work.  As expected, this variable is insignificant for the working and paid 
hourly category.  In general, the results of the multi-state selection model are consistent 
with expectations.  Based on these results, we estimate conditional expectations for the 
wage equation’s error for each labor force state and include these terms as independent 
variables in the hedonic wage model.   
Table 2 provides summary statistics and a selected set of parametric estimates 
from six of the hedonic wage models motivated by equation (5).
13 All estimated wage 
                                                 
12 Household capital income is the sum of household business or farm income, self-employment earnings, 
business income, gross rent, dividend and interest income, trust funds or royalties, and other asset income. 
13 In order to assure the existence of a wage-risk premium in line with the existing literature, we estimate a 
conventional hedonic wage model (equation (5) without any of the interaction terms).  The estimated 
coefficient on the risk term in this equation is statistically significant and equal to 0.042.  This implies an 
estimated VSL of $9.6 million (2000$), above the median of $7 million reported in Viscusi and Aldy’s 
[2003] meta analysis, but still within the range of values from what they considered to be the most reliable 
studies.  
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equations were adjusted for selection effects as discussed above.  While not reported, the 
selection terms are jointly significant influences on wages (p-value = 0.01).  The number 
in parentheses below the estimated parameters in the second through seventh columns of 
Table 2 presents the ratios of the estimated coefficients to their respective estimated 
standard errors based on the Huber [1967] robust covariance matrix.  In earlier research 
we compared the Huber robust covariance matrix along with bootstrapped standard errors 
and found no differences in conclusions about the role of job risk, age, and risk 
preferences. Each of the models includes fixed effects for the occupational categories 
identified in equation (5) but these are not reported in the table. 
The remaining models in the table are distinguished based on the treatment of the 
age terms and the inclusion or exclusion of the quality of life and subjective longevity  
interaction terms.  Specification (2) includes age in linear and quadratic terms as well as 
in categorized variables that are interacted with the BLS risk.  Specifications (3) and (4) 
drop the categorized treatment of age and use the linear and quadratic terms with risk 
interactions as in work by Aldy and Viscusi.  These two specifications vary based on the 
inclusion or exclusion of risk tolerance, quality of life and longevity threat effects.  In 
order to investigate whether the treatment of serious longevity threats influences 
estimates of risk tradeoffs independent of quality of life considerations, we re-estimate 
the primary model, eliminating the interaction effects used to identify the quality of life 
assessments. We repeat the same exercise eliminating interactions for longevity threats to 
consider whether the quality of life effects are robust to this exclusion. The final two 
specifications in Table (2) report these results.  In addition to the estimates reported in 
Table 2, we also considered a variety of other models that varied the treatment of the risk   21
tolerance, the quality of life/health status, and the longevity effects terms.  All of these 
variations were developed to evaluate whether our basic conclusions would change with 
plausible variations in the model specification. A summary of these comparisons would 
suggest that our findings are quite robust to all of the model variations we considered. 
Because the BLS risk term enters alone and in interactions with age, risk tolerance 
measures, and the variables used to gauge the quality of life and longevity perceptions, 
the size, magnitude and significance of the coefficient for the simple risk term cannot be 
interpreted independently.  The interaction terms including the risk measure must be 
considered in evaluating the size and significance of the estimated marginal effect of job 
risk on the natural log of wages.  To test for the effects of risk on wage compensation 
requirements we need to consider several different coefficient sums.  The estimated wage 
differentials are formed by summing the coefficients on the risk term and the appropriate 






 is zero for respondents in the second age and risk tolerance categories, who 
reported poor health two years earlier, and who die in the next two years, the relevant test 
statistic is given by 
∧ ∧ ∧
+ + + 2 2 1 γ α β
∧
2 θ . 
In discussing the results of our hedonic wage analysis, we begin with the primary 
model.  The first step in considering the effects of age, risk tolerance, quality of 
life/health status, and anticipated longevity on estimated wage-risk tradeoffs is to test 
whether all these interactions can jointly be omitted from the model.  We reject the null 
hypothesis that the interaction terms are jointly zero (p-value = 0.006).  The set of age 
and risk tolerance interactions terms are jointly significant at a marginal level (p-value =   22
0.099); the health status and anticipated longevity effects strengthen the importance of 
the set of interactions.
14  
To highlight the effects of quality of life and serious longevity threats on the 
estimated risk tradeoffs, Table 3 presents a subset of our results from four separate 
models.  In particular, we select the two most risk averse categories and the three age 
categories that span the age range of which the HRS is intended to be representative, 51-






 by group.  In parentheses below each estimated coefficient sum, we report 
the p-value for a test that the sum is significantly different from zero.  In columns 2 
through 5 we report the coefficient sums for two models, each of which includes terms 
for both subjective health-related quality of life, under “Excellent health” and “Not 
excellent health”, and the presence and absence of threats to longevity, under “Longevity 
threat” and “No longevity threat”.
15  The coefficient sum reported in the left-hand side of 
each cell results from specification (1), our primary model.  The coefficient sum reported 
in the right-hand side of each cell results from specification (3).  Recall these 
specifications differ only in their treatment of age; specification (1) treats age non-
parametrically while specification (3) follows the parametric treatment of age used in 
                                                 
14 While not reported, we estimated a model excluding the age and risk tolerance interaction terms.  The 
estimated coefficients (and levels of significance) on the three interaction terms measuring the effects of 
health status and longevity threats are similar to our primary model. 




∂ ln  is zero 
for some of the groups not represented in Table 3.  However, all unreported coefficient sums from this 
model are either positive and statistically significant or not statistically different from zero.  See Smith et al. 
[2004] for a discussion of differences between the younger workers represented in the HRS sample and the 
Current Population Survey.  Full results are available from the authors.     23
Viscusi and Aldy.
16  Computation of comparable coefficient sums using the results of 
specification (3) required that we focus on particular ages, rather than age ranges.  For 
comparison, we computed coefficient sums for ages 55, 60, and 65.  Comparing the terms 
within each cell, we see the magnitude of the estimated effects are very similar regardless 
of our treatment of age.  Given these similarities, we restrict our attention in the 
discussion that follows to the results for specification (1), reported in the left-hand side of 
each cell. 
We conduct pair-wise comparisons of the estimated coefficient sums (from 
specification (1)), testing whether or not the observed differences across groups are 
statistically significant.  The null hypothesis is equality of the estimated coefficient sums 
corresponding to each comparison pair.  Table 4 reports the p-values of a subset of these 
tests where the age and risk tolerance categories are held constant.   
The results allow us to distinguish three types of effects.  First, we discuss test 
results for how impending serious longevity threats -- facing the prospect of death -- 
influence the risk tradeoff.  This relationship also serves as a test of one interpretation of 
the Pratt-Zeckhauser [1996] dead anyway hypothesis—individuals facing impending 
serious health threats would be willing to pay more to realize even a small risk reduction.  
Second, we investigate whether an individual's subjective opinion of his health-related 
                                                 
16 The results of specification (3) are consistent with an inverted U-shaped relationship between age and the 
VSL as has been found in work summarized by Aldy and Viscusi [2007b].  However, the estimated peak of 
the relationship occurs around age 56 for our sample.  Aldy and Viscusi report a peak at about age 40. Two 
aspects of this comparison should be noted. First, if we review the results from our earlier analysis that did 
not take account of quality or quantity issues and introduced age non-parametrically, the estimated wage 
rsik tradeoffs were not precisely estimated for the 61-to 65 age group. Age category 56-60 was the last 
group with significant estimates of the effects by risk tolerance group (see table 3 in Smith et al. [2004]). 
Second and equally important, a quadratic specification for any variable restricts effects to a parabolic form 
(either U or inverted U shapes). A non-parametric or categorical coding allows for different effects by age 
category but does not restrict the form of those differences. As a result, it is our preferred treatment for 
examining age effects.      24
quality of life influences the relative size of the effect due to serious longevity threats.  
Finally, we examine the independent effect of quality of life on the estimated risk 
tradeoffs. 
Pair wise comparisons of the terms in the left-hand sides of columns 2 and 3, and 
4 and 5 respectively provide evidence consistent with an effect of longevity threats on 
risk tradeoffs and support what we described as the dead anyway hypothesis.  For a given 
age, risk tolerance category, and quality of life, the dead anyway hypothesis would 
suggest larger coefficient sums among individuals who expect serious adverse health 
shocks (columns 2 and 4 of Table 3).  For people who rated their health as excellent in 
wave 1 with an impending serious longevity threat, the coefficient sums presented in 
column 2 are at least six times the size of the estimated risk tradeoff for those in excellent 
health without the impending threat.  This difference is significant at the high end of 
conventional levels (p-value = 0.085).  Comparisons of columns 4 and 5 confirm the 
large differential associated with impending threats to longevity for individuals in health 
categories other than excellent.  This difference is also significant (p-value = 0.050).  The 
estimated coefficient sums reported in columns 2 and 4 are large and would imply 
extremely large VSL measures.  We return to this point later in the discussion of our 
results. 
Comparisons of coefficient sums associated with excellent or not excellent health 
within the same age, risk tolerance, and longevity threat category allow us to examine 
quality of life effects.  Among those respondents with impending serious longevity 
threats, the coefficient sums for the excellent health categories (in column 2) consistently 
exceed those for the “not in excellent health” groups (in column 4).  However, as   25
reported in Table 4, these differences are not statistically significant (p-value = 0.254).  
Comparing the coefficient sums in columns 3 and 5 yields a smaller but statistically 
significant quality of life premium among respondents who do not expect serious health 
threats (p-value = 0.018). 
In order to investigate whether the effects of serious longevity threats displayed a 
fairly robust influence on risk tradeoffs independent of quality of life considerations, we 
conduct a similar exercise using the results of specification (5).  A subset of these results 
is presented in columns six and seven of Table 3.  Pair-wise comparisons confirm a 
significant premium (p-value = 0.019) for those who face serious threats, the relative size 
of which is consistent with the model accounting for quality of life differences.  
However, the coefficient sums are not as large, suggesting that quality of life and serious 
threats to longevity may well be confounded in these estimates. 
The results presented in the final two columns of Table 3 reflect the impact of 
differences in quality of life, independent of longevity threats, on the estimated wage-risk 
tradeoffs.  The selected coefficient sums are formed using the results of specification (6), 
which excludes the interaction terms used to identify the effects of serious longevity 
threats.  The coefficient sums in the eighth column, reflecting those with excellent health-
related quality of life, are approximately twice as large as the respective coefficient sums 
in the final column.  The estimated quality of life premium suggested by pair-wise 
comparisons of these coefficient sums is significant (p-value = 0.018).  
To further explore the implications of allowing the estimated risk tradeoffs to vary 
with quality of life, we compute what we call relative risk tradeoffs for the age/risk 
tolerance groups with significant coefficient sums in the final two columns of Table 3.   26
Table 5 presents these relative risk tradeoffs, which represent ratios of the associated 
VSL estimates in 2000 dollars for respondents in excellent health to the VSL estimates 
for respondents not in excellent health.  Below each relative tradeoff is the p-value for a 
test that the ratio is significantly different from one.  We test this hypothesis using the 
nlcom command in Stata.
17  In each case, the relative tradeoff is significantly different 
from one at a p-value of 0.05 or less, indicating that individuation on the basis of quality 
of life leads to a significant difference in estimates of the marginal rate of substitution 
between risk and wealth.  For the respondents in our sample, excellent health almost 
doubles the incremental risk tradeoff.   
As we noted, if differences in health status lead to variation in the degree of 
complementarity between consumption and labor supply, we should also expect 
differences in estimated risk tradeoffs with health status.  Our results are consistent with 
this response.  Of course, we would not suggest that all the variation in VSL estimates 
with age can be attributed exclusively to differences in the health status of older adults.  
Rather we argue that it is important to acknowledge that the older adults in our sample 
differentially experience serious health conditions that can alter their subjective 
assessments of the quality of their lives and influence their labor/leisure choices.   
For each individual, consumption decisions are constrained by time as well as 
income; time is required to enjoy the consumption that is permitted by increased income 
arising from the labor each person supplies.  Chetty’s analysis reminds analysts that when 
we attempt to understand the interactions between labor supply and risk preferences 
revealed through wage/risk tradeoffs, we have several “windows” on preferences. In our 
                                                 
17 The calculation assumes that wage, hours worked per week, and weeks worked per year are fixed at the 
mean values for the respective age and risk tolerance category.   27
analysis variation in health status was one means to reconcile Chetty’s argument for 
different degrees of complementarity between labor supply and consumption to motivate 
variation in the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption (and in the labor supply 
elasticity and VSL).   
Before turning to a brief discussion of the implications of these findings, it is 
important to acknowledge that our results are consistent across age and risk tolerance 
classes and different estimated wage models.  We have limited the discussion of the full 
structure of our wage model or the multiple state selection model because both have been 
discussed for another closely related sample in Smith et al. [2004].  However, these other 
components of the model assure that for this sample the effects of the quality of life and 
serious longevity threat terms are being estimated within a framework that  accounts for 
an array of conventional covariates as well as the selection effects associated with the 
labor force participation decision. 
As a final exercise, we estimate two additional models, both variants of our 
primary model, in order to examine the robustness of our results to changes in our 
longevity threat measure.  First, we replace the future deaths variable with an alternative 
instrument measuring serious threats to longevity, a qualitative variable identifying a 
newly diagnosed cancer or stroke between waves 2 and 3.  Compared to the number of 
deaths experienced between waves 2 and 3, there were more new cases of these two 
serious health conditions (i.e., 46 cases versus 23 deaths).
18  We re-estimated the model 
reported in columns six and seven of Table 3 using this new variable.  As a second 
exercise, we replace the future deaths variable with a variable indicating more than one   28
hospital stay between waves 2 and 3.
 19  Table 6 reports the resulting coefficient sums 
from these two models for a subset of age and risk tolerance groups.
20  For both models, 
pair-wise comparisons indicate significant differences between the coefficient sums 
reported in columns 2 and 3 (p-value = 0.078), and 4 and 5 (p-value = 0.018).  The results 
confirm a premium when we replace a future death with these two alternative indicators 
of serious threats to longevity.    
 
V. Implications 
  The mature workers in our sample appear to select jobs with risks in ways that are 
conditioned by their personal assessments of their longevity and the quality of their lives.  
Serious threats to longevity affect the expected quantity of life remaining and, as a result, 
the relative risk tradeoffs. We have provided a model that indicates a clear role for 
subjective assessments of health status in these tradeoffs as well.  Those in excellent 
health require significantly greater compensation to accept risk increases compared to 
those who are not.  This finding lends support to health status or quality of life as a 
potential source of variation in the degree complementarity between consumption and 
labor supply. 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 The number of deaths may seem especially limiting, considering all the coefficients reported in Table 1.  
However, only two parameters (θ2 and θ3) are estimated to distinguish the hypotheses regarding quality of 
life and longevity threats. 
19 124 respondents report more than one hospital stay between waves 2 and 3.  In these final two models, 
the sample sizes in the hedonic wage model reduce to 2521 and 2520 due to the exclusion of those who die 
between waves 2 and 3 and to those respondents for whom we are unable to determine whether or not they 
have experienced a stroke or cancer or a hospital stay in between waves 2 and 3.  While not reported, the 
estimated coefficients of the selection models and the hedonic wage models are similar to the results 
reported in Tables 1 and 2. 
20 All but one unreported coefficient sum for the final two models is either positive and statistically 
significant or not statistically different from zero.  In the future cancer or stroke model, the estimated 
coefficient sum for the older than 66, most risk tolerant with no future cancer or stoke group is negative and 
statistically significant.       29
  Thus, these estimates suggest that current modeling decisions that rely on simple 
descriptions of each individual’s life expectancy based on age alone may offer 
incomplete basis for judging the wage/ risk tradeoffs underlying the measures for the 
VSL. We must consider whether a person’s perceived health status influences the mix of 
consumption goods and services selected, the amount and quality of leisure time selected, 
and the net outcome of these factors on the measured extent of complementarity between 
the consumption and labor supplied to the market. These influences may become more 
relevant as a person ages.   
Our findings support the feasibility of using a sample of individuals in a panel 
format to sort out some of the determinants of heterogeneous risk preferences, rather than 
resorting to experts’ judgments as in the QALY literature.  The detailed records of actual 
health conditions, subjective evaluations of perceived health status, and panel structure of 
the HRS allow us to demonstrate how it would be possible to measure the influence of 
these factors on the relative size of different individuals’ risk tradeoffs. The next step is to 
expand the samples considered beyond the older respondents in the HRS and evaluate 
where analogous serious longevity threats and quality of life judgments affect younger 
adults in similar ways.   30
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Table 1. Multinomial logit selection model of labor force status
a
 
Working and paid hourly  Unemployed  Fully retired or partially 
retired but not working 
Disabled  Not in labor force   
 















































































































































N 2708  261  2635  436  1013 
 
a * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.  Reference category, with 3879 observations, is working and not paid hourly.  Summary statistics for this 
category are as follows: Married—0.83 (0.37), Age—56.04 (5.34), # people in household—2.58 (1.14), Household capital income—20841.68 (80357.23), Health 
limits work—0.09 (0.29).  Total number of observations for the multinomial logit selection model is 10932 with a pseudo R-squared value of 0.15.  35
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Age _  0.0449 
(-1.72) 
_  _ _ _  55.91 
(5.03) 
Age2   _  -0.0004 
(-1.71) 
_  _ _ _  _ 
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_ _  -0.0739 
(-0.61) 
-0.0784 
(-0.65)  0.027 




_ _  0.0003 
(0.004) 
-0.0031 
(-0.04)  0.081 




_  _  0.0597 
(1.35) 
0.0562 
(1.27)  0.35 




_  _  0.0782* 
(1.99) 
0.0724 
(1.84)  0.37 




_  _  0.0727 
(1.77) 
0.0673 
(1.64)  0.15 











(0.24)  0.11 











(1.12)  0.11 




















_ _  0.0515* 











_  0.085 
                                                 
a The numbers in parentheses in the second column are the ratios of the estimated coefficients to their 
estimated standard errors based on the Huber [1967] robust estimates for the variance covariance matrix.    
* indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.  The final column reports means and standard deviations 
for the continuous variables, or the fraction of the sample for the dichotomous variables listed in column 
one.  The values reported in this column for the interaction terms represent the fraction of the sample in the 
relevant age or risk tolerance category (independent of the job risk term).  The values reported for 
Exhealth(t-1) and Dead(t+1) designate the fraction of the sample reporting excellent health in the preceding 
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Table 3.  Selected tests of quality of life and longevity threat effects on estimated risk tradeoffs
a 
 
Risk tradeoff with quality of life and longevity threat adjustments  Risk tradeoff with longevity 
threat adjustment 
Risk tradeoff with quality of life 
adjustment 




Longevity threat  No longevity 
threat 






Excellent health  Not excellent 
health 
Age 51-55 
3 0.651*  |  0.660* 
(0.052) | (0.049) 
0.072* | 0.088* 
(0.052) | (0.009) 
0.247* | 0.260* 
(0.037) | (0.027) 
0.021 | 0.036 









4 0.672*  |  0.681* 
(0.046) | (0.043) 
0.093* | 0.109* 
(0.002) | (0.000) 
0.268* | 0.282* 
(0.022) | (0.015) 
0.042* | 0.058* 










3 0.671*  |  0.659* 
(0.046) | (0.049) 
0.092* | 0.087* 
(0.006) | (0.011) 
0.288* | 0.259* 
(0.014) | (0.029) 
0.062* | 0.035* 









4 0.692*  |  0.680* 
(0.040) | (0.043) 
0.113* | 0.108* 
(0.000) | (0.000) 
0.262* | 0.280 
(0.030) | (0.016) 
0.036 | 0.056* 










3 0.666*  |  0.621* 
(0.048) | (0.065) 
0.087* | 0.048 
(0.041) | (0.230) 
0.247* | 0.221* 
(0.037) | (0.067) 
0.021 | -0.0032 









4 0.687*  |  0.642* 
(0.042) | (0.057) 
0.108* | 0.069* 
(0.001) | (0.036) 
0.268* | 0.242* 
(0.022) | (0.042) 
0.042* | 0.018 









                                                 
a The numbers are coefficient sums defining  ( ) ( ) ( ) BLSrisk wage ∂ ∂ / ln  for each age, risk tolerance, quality of life, and severe health threat groups.  Numbers in 
parentheses are p-values for the null hypothesis that the coefficient sum is zero.  * indicates p-value of 0.10 or lower.  The Huber [1967] robust estimate for the 
variance covariance matrix of the estimated parameters is used in forming the variance of the coefficient sums implied by each element in the table. 
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Table 4.  Results of pair-wise comparisons
a 
 








0.085 0.254 0.061 
Excellent, No 
longevity threat 
   0.134  0.018 
Not excellent, 
Longevity threat 
     0.050 
 
                                                 
a The table reports p-values for pair-wise comparisons of the estimated wage-risk tradeoff, 
() () ( ) BLSrisk wage ∂ ∂ / ln , for each quality of life and severe longevity threat group for a given age and risk 
tolerance category based on the results presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3.  In all cases the Huber [1967] robust 
estimate for the variance covariance matrix of the estimated parameters is used in forming the test statistic.  
The null hypothesis is equality of the estimated coefficient sums for each pair presented in the table. 
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Table 5. Relative risk tradeoffs for quality of life effects
a 
 
Age category  Risk tolerance category  Relative risk tradeoff 
(p-value) 
51-55 4  2.16* 
(0.014) 
56-60 4  1.85* 
(0.000) 
61-65 4  1.93* 
(0.004) 
 
                                                 
a The relative risk tradeoffs are formed using estimates of the average wage, hours, and weeks worked for 
each age risk tolerance group.  Numbers in parentheses are p-values for the null hypothesis that the relative 
risk tradeoff is one.  * indicates that the ratio is significantly different from one with a p-value of 0.05 or 
less using the nlcom command in Stata.  The test assumes wage, hours worked per week, and weeks 
worked per year are fixed at their mean values for the respective age and risk tolerance category. 
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 Baseline  mortality  measure:  newly 
diagnosed future cancer or stroke 
Baseline mortality measure: more than 
one future hospital stay 
Risk tolerance 
category 
Future cancer or 
stroke 
No future cancer 
or stroke 
More than one 
future hospital stay 























































                                                 
a The numbers are coefficient sums defining  ( ) ( ) ( ) BLSrisk wage ∂ ∂ / ln  for each age, risk tolerance, and 
baseline risk groups.  Numbers in parentheses are p-values for the null hypothesis that the coefficient sum 
was zero.  * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.  The Huber [1967] robust estimate for the 
variance covariance matrix of the estimated parameters is used in forming the variance of the coefficient 
sums implied by each element in the table. 